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ABSTRACT
In spread-spectrum watermarking, the watermarked document is obtained from the addition of an attenuated
watermark signal to a cover multimedia document. A traditional strategy consists of optimising the detector
for a given embedding function. In general, this leads to sub-optimal detection and much improvement can be
obtained by exploiting side-information available at the embedder. In some prior art, the authors showed that
for blind detection of small signals, maximum detection power is obtained to first order by setting the watermark
signal to the gradient of the detector. Recently, Malvar et al. improved the performance of direct-sequence
spread-spectrum watermarking by using a signal dependent modulation. In the first part of the paper, we
develop this idea further and extend Costa’s decoding theory to the problem of watermarking detection. In the
second part, we propose a practical implementation of this work using non-linear detectors based on our family
of polynomial functions. We show some improved performance of the technique.
Keywords: Digital watermarking, Detection, Side Information
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the problem of detecting the presence of a watermark signal in a digital content. Recently,
side-informed embedding strategies have been shown to greatly improve watermark detection. These strategies
exploit knowledge of the original signal in the construction of the watermark vector. Such knowledge can be
used to set the watermark vector direction and the watermark strength. In particular, this paper presents
strategies to modulate the watermarking strength depending on the original content to be protected. The
document is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a general watermarking framework, adopting the notation
first introduced by Cox et al .1 Section 3 reviews the prior art while Section 4 presents the watermark detection
problem from a theoretical point-of-view, exploring different watermarking schemes and evaluating them using
information theory tools. Section 5 describes some practical strategies that can be applied to some well-known
watermarking schemes. Section 6 finally gives some experimental results, that illustrate the trade-off between
robustness and embedding distortion.
2. FRAMEWORK
This section describes the mathematical framework of the problem we are dealing with and sets the notation
used thereafter.
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2.1. Modelling Contents
Various different types of content can be watermarked: sounds, images, movies, software codes. All of them are
a digital representation of a work that can be handled by computers. The object of this paper is to focus on a
general versatile framework applicable to all watermarking techniques, rather than to detail a specific method
designed for one particular kind of contents. For this reason, we will assume that there exists a suitable feature
extraction method that maps each kind of content in space C to a point in the watermark space isomorphic to
R
N . The watermark embedding and detection take place in this space and we assume that is possible to extract
N real features from an original content and to map them back to produce a watermarked content. Formally,
we define the extraction process X(.) as:
X(.) : C → RN
C → r = X(C) (1)
The original content and its extracted vector satisfy ro = X(Co). The inverse extraction process maps the
modified features back into the content:
X−1(.) : {C, RN} → C
{C,y} → C ′ = X−1(C,y) (2)
At the embedding stage ro is mapped to rw and the watermarked content is produced as Cw = X−1(Co, rw).
2.2. Embedding
As mentioned earlier, the embedding process is restricted to a function E(.) whose domain of definition and
range are RN . It is defined as follows:
E(.) : RN → RN
rw → rw = E(ro) (3)
To reflect the change in ro, we specify E(.) as:
rw = E(ro) = ro + g(ro)w(ro) (4)
where w(ro) is a vector whose norm is set to unity, and g(ro) is a scalar controlling the embedding strength.
The embedding distortion is defined in expectation as:
DE = E{‖rw − ro‖2} = E{g(ro)2} (5)
where E{.} is the statistical expectation. In addition, we assume that the extracted vectors ro define a white
gaussian noise of power σ2o . Watermark to Content power Ratio is then defined as WCR = DE/Nσ2o . This ratio
is extremely low (typically −26 dB), so that it is assumed that the watermarked vectors rw have a power of
∼ σ2o .
2.3. Attack
The attacks are blind as the attacker may not have access to the extracted vectors. The impact of the attack is
modelled as the addition of white gaussian noise of power is σ2n followed by Wiener filtering. This is equivalent
to multiplication by a factor ρ =
√
σ2o/(σ2o + σ2n) such that:
rp = ρ(rw + n) (6)
The effect of the ρ factor is to set the power of the attacked signal to the same level as the watermarked vector,
while maintaining the Noise to Content power Ratio to NCR = σ2n/σ
2
o . Moreover, the distortion due to this
attack, measured by
DA = E{‖rp − rw‖2} = N((1− ρ)2σ2o + ρ2σ2n), (7)
is indeed lower than the distortion without factor ρ. Clearly the attacker should perform such Wiener filtering
in order to decrease the impact of the attack∗.
∗Thanks to Stéphane Pateux for pointing out this fact.
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2.4. Detection
The detector receives an unknown content whose extracted vector is denoted ru. In the detection process, we
distinguish two hypotheses: namely hypothesis H0 that ru is an original non-watermarked vector and hypothesis
H1 that ru is an attacked watermarked vector. Under both hypotheses, the power of ru is equal to σ2o .
To distinguish between H0 and H1, the detector applies a function D(.), called the detection function, to the
received vector. It yields a kind of likelihood that hypothesis H1 is true (versus hypothesis H0).
D(.) : RN → R
ru → d = D(ru) (8)
The output of the detection function is compared to a threshold T , which is set to achieve a given probability of
false alarm Pfa . The detector declares ru is not watermarked if d < T . It decides it is watermarked if d > T .
2.5. Robustness
The idea of robustness was first introduce by Cox et al.,6 and depending on the watermarking method, there
may exist a function measuring the robustness of a given point in the space. The robustness is measured as the
power of independent noise to be added to lower, in expectation, D(rw) below the threshold value T and defined
as:
R(.) : RN → R
r → R(r) = ‖n‖2 (9)
2.6. Performance
Various measures can be used to compare different watermarking methods and evaluate the performance for a
given vector of length N :
1. DE , the embedding distortion (or equivalently the ratio WCR).
2. Pfa = E{(d > T )|H0}, the probability of false alarm.
3. Pp = E{(d > T )|H1}, the power of the detection test.
4. DKL, the Kullbach-Leibler distance between the pdf of the original vector and the watermarked vector.
Section 4 details the importance of this criterion.
5. ε = µd|H1/σd|H1 , the deflection factor of the tested statistic.
6. η = (T −µd|H1)/σd|H1 , the argument of the cdf of N (0, 1) to calculate the power of the test in the gaussian
case: Pp = 1− Q(η).
Criteria 1 to 3 directly reflect the performance of the test. They can be estimated experimentally by averaging
a huge number of trials. Criteria 4 to 6 are not direct outputs of the test but can help in interpreting how
parameters are related to yield criteria 1 to 3. Criteria 5 and 6 are more deeply concerned with the case of the
tested statistic being gaussian distributed. An important issue is to determine how criteria 2 to 6 depend on the
parameters {N,WCR,NCR}.
3. DESCRIPTION OF PRIOR ART
This section presents a brief overview of five methods for watermark detection; namely Direct-Sequence Spread-
Sprectum (DSSS), Just Another N-order Informed Scheme (Janis), Zero Attraction (ZATT), Peaking DSSS
(PEAK) and Improved Spread-Spectrum (ISS).
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3.1. DSSS: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
In this well known method,2 the watermark signal is constant in its direction and in its norm,
g(r)w(r) = gw (10)
The detection function is a linear correlation between ru and w, given by,
D(ro) =
N∑
i=1
w[i]ro[i]
‖r‖ (11)
3.2. JANIS: Just Another N-order Informed Scheme
In this method,3, 4 the watermarked vector, w(ro), is equal to the normalised gradient of the detection function
at the point ro. Thus, this vector points in the direction ro + h where D(ro + h) increases at the highest rate.
The embedding strength is constant.
g(ro)w(ro) = g
∇D(ro)
‖∇D(ro)‖ (12)
This strategy has been analysed on a simple nth-order polynomial detection function:
D(ro) =
N/n∑
i=1
n∏
j=1
ro[ij ] (13)
For small orders n, D(ro) is gaussian distributed under both hypotheses with different means and variances i.e.
N (0, σd|H02) and N (µd|H1 , σd|H12).
3.3. ZATT: Zero Attraction
In this method,5 g(r)w(r) is not constant. Basically, the embedding resets a small number of secret projections
of the original vector to zero. The embedding is defined as:
rw = (I−P)ro
where P is a secret projection matrix of rank k = DE/σ2o. Watermark embedding is achieved by removing
some part of the signal. With the additive attack, the k projections are not set to zero but they are distributed
as N (0, ρ2σ2n).
The detection function calculates the energy of the k projections and decides that the received vector is
watermarked if this energy is below a given threshold.
3.4. PEAK: Peaking DSSS
In this method,6 w(r) is constant and set to w, a normalised vector, but its amplitude g(r) varies. In fact,
the embedding perfectly sets the projection of the vector onto w to a discrete value. It is an ‘erase and write’
strategy, as referred to by Costa.7 The embedding is defined as:
rw = ro + (α −wT ro)w
The parameter α is given by:
DE = α2 + σ2o
Clearly, to enforce this method, DE should be greater than σ2o , which the energy required to reset the projection
to zero. This can be stated as N WCR > 1. With the attack, the projection onto w is not set to α but it is
distributed as N (α, ρ2σ2n).
The detection function is the same as DSSS, a linear correlation between ru and w.
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3.5. ISS: Improved Spread Spectrum
ISS is a generalisation of PEAK.8 In this case, w(r) is also constant and set to w, a normalized vector, but
its amplitude g(r) varies. The embedding sets the projection of the vector onto w to a value depending on the
original vector. It makes a trade-off between the embedding distortion and the robustness. It is a ‘writing on
dirty paper’ strategy and the embedding process is defined as:
rw = ro + (α − λwT ro)w
Parameters {α, λ} satisfy the equation:
DE = α2 + λ2σ2o
The detection function is the same as DSSS, a linear correlation between ru and w. For α2 = DE and λ = 0,
the scheme reduces to DSSS. For α2 = DE − σ2x and λ = 1, it reduces to PEAK.
4. THEORETICAL COMPARISON
4.1. Wiping out a Cliché
At a first glance, it would seem that the problem of watermark detection is simpler than the decoding of hidden
symbols, because the final output of a decoding system belongs to a message space which is larger than the
detection range {0, 1}. However, the authors believe this is not true for the following reasons.
Firstly, no theoretical limit has been shown for watermark detection. In the decoding problem, Costa has
shown that the capacity of the watermarking channel is bounded above by the optimal capacity given by:7
C =
1
2
log(1 +
DE
Nσ2n
).
The fundamental insight is that the optimal capacity does out depend on the power of the original vector. It
is equal to the capacity when the decoder is not blind. An interesting problem is to find the equivalent of this
bound for the detection problem. In detection, a binary decision is required and we are not concerned with
channel capacity. The detection goal is to distinguish from which of two probability distributions a received
vector is drawn. A measure of the difference between these two distributions is required. We argue that the
statistical Kullback-Leibler ‘distance’9 (DKL) can play the role of capacity for detection.
What is the upper bound in terms of this measure? Copying Costa’s solution, we might believe that this bound
is given when the decoder knows the original vector. In this case, DKL = +∞ which implies that it is possible
to build a perfect test (Pp → 1 ∀Pfa ∈ (0, 1]) regardless of the strength of the attack. This is obvious for a
non-blind detector as it already knows ro. Yet, this is not possible when the detector is blind.
The fundamental difference between detection and decoding is the fact that the decoder is a multiple hypothesis
test (one per hidden symbol) where the hypothesis to receive an ‘untouched’ and ‘raw’ original vector is not
considered. Nevertheless, it might possible to have a bound that only depends on {DE , N, σ2n}. However, it has
not been found yet.
Secondly, Costa not only gives the theoretically bound, but also shows a way to achieve it. This method is
not possible in practice, but, at least, it gives some clues to derive some good ‘dirty paper codes’.10, 11 Basically,
the game of watermarking decoding now is to easily build, partition, and quickly browse a set of codewords in
R
N .12 In watermarking detection, so far, we have absolutely no clue how to derive a good solution.
4.2. Detection Theory
The Kullbach-Leibler distance between the two random processes ro and rp is defined as an integral over RN :
DKL(RN ) =
∫
RN
pH0(r) log
pH0(r)
pH1(r)
dr
5
According to the data processing theorem,9 we have:
DKL(RN ) ≥ DKL(R) ≥ DKL({0, 1}) = Pfa log Pfa
Pp
+ (1− Pfa) log (1− Pfa)(1− Pp) (14)
where DKL(R) (DKL({0, 1})) is the KL distance for the random variable d (resp. (d > T )). Hence, the perfor-
mance of the detectors, in terms of {Pfa , Pp} are limited by DKL(RN ) via (14). For instance, if we are looking
for a perfect test where Pfa = 0, then its power is bounded above by:
Pp ≤ 1− e−DKL(RN )
The power of the test tends to one only if DKL(RN ) goes to +∞. This results in a new way of considering
the watermarking detection problem. The goal is to find an embedding function E(.) that maximises DKL(RN )
under the distortion constraint given by (5).
4.3. Comparing Kullbach-Leibler distances
Table 1 gives the KL distances for the watermarking methods considered in Section 3.
Table 1. Comparing DKL
Method Space DKL without noise DKL with noise
DSSS RN 12N WCR
1
2N WCRρ
2
JANIS R 12nN WCR
1
2
(
log
σd|H1
2
σd|H0
2 − 1 +
σd|H0
2
σd|H1
2 +
µd|H1
2
σd|H1
2
)
ZATT RN +∞ 12N WCR
(
log(NCRρ2)− 1 + 1
NCRρ2
)
PEAK R +∞ 12
(
log(NCRρ2)− 1 + 1
NCRρ2
+ N WCR− 1NCR
)
Note that ZATT, PEAK and ISS have an infinite measure of DKL when there is no attack. It means that a
perfect test is theoretically possible. For instance, with the ZATT method, under H0, d is a continuous random
variable whose pdf’s range is (0,+∞], whereas under H1, it becomes a deterministic value. The probability
P(d = 0|H0) is null as the singleton 0 does not belong to the Borel extension of R. The test considers the
received vector to be watermarked if d = 0. Hence, (Pfa , Pp) = (0, 1) when there is no attack. The ZATT and
PEAK methods are particular cases of the strategy of using a quantisation process as the embedder. Roughly,
this transforms a continuous random variable into a discrete random variable. Since in this case Pfa is the
integral of a pdf over a set of discrete values, Pfa = 0. Under H1, it is easily shown that Pp = 1. Note that
no requirement has been made about the quantisation grain, so that in theory, the quantisation (or embedding)
distortion can tend to zero whilst maintaining the same performance.
When some noise is added, the discrete random variable is transformed into a continuous random variable
which is the convolution of the pmf by the pdf of the noise, i.e. a multimodal gaussian. In the ZATT method, the
test yields the binary output (d < T ) with the threshold T set by the probability of false alarm. The performance
of the test decreases with the amount of noise.
Figure 1 gives the plot of the Kullbach-Leibler distances for various schemes. Whereas, for ZATT, PEAK,
and ISS, DKL tends to +∞ when there is no attack, it quickly decreases in the presence of noise, contrary to
DSSS which is very robust (DKL decreases very slowly).
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Figure 1. DKL against NCR in dB, with N WCR = 2.56 (N = 1024, WCR = −26 dB). (a) DKL for methods of prior
art (cf. Section 3). (b) Improvement due to the Florencio-Malvar embedding strategy, for DSSS and JANIS.
5. EMBEDDING STRATEGIES
This section endeavors to explore different strategies concerning the design of the function g(.). They were
introduced by Miller et al. for their scheme.13 We aim to apply these strategies to others schemes.
It is clear that in practice, the embedding strength of the watermark signal varies and typically depends on a
perceptual model, which acts like a local gain controller. In having selected an extremely simple content model
free from perceptual considerations in Section 2, we would like to study various performance-related reasons for
varying the embedding strength depending on the content. Importantly it should be noted that the strategies
analysed here are used at the embedding stage under hypothesis H1 and do not change anything at the detection
side. The fundamental reason upon which this statement is based is the Neyman-Pearson detection strategy,
where threshold T is only related to Pfa , i.e. what happens under hypothesis H0.
5.1. Maximising Detection for Fixed Distortion
The fixed distortion strategy is the most common strategy in watermarking. Both DSSS and JANIS follow this
strategy as explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The constraint on the embedding distortion is not only fulfilled in
average but for all content:
g(ro) = g =
√
DE ∀ro ∈ RN (15)
This does not mean that the watermarking vector is fixed. In fact for JANIS, w(ro) is directed to the point
on the N -dimensional hypersphere of radius g and centre ro, which maximises D(ro + gw(ro)). This latter
method has better performance than DSSS because, for the same embedding distortion DE , the detection yields
more separated pdf’s under both hypotheses. In other words, the tested statistic in the JANIS method is more
sensitive to the embedding distortion than in DSSS. Two very simple ideas8 can be used to improve this strategy
and consist of pre-processing (before the embedding process) and a post-processing (after the embedding process)
steps based on the detection function:
• pre-processing : if D(ro) > T then rw = ro, as there is no need to run the embedding.
• post-processing : if D(E(ro)) < T then rw = ro as the embedding process has been useless.
These ideas have an impact on the global embedding distortion which becomes smaller DE ′ = DE(Pp − Pfa).
The pre-processing saves a small amount of distortion as it concerns original vectors yielding a probability of
false alarm, which is supposed to be small. The post-processing might save a dramatic amount of distortion in
the case where the power of the test is not so high (i.e. when N WCR is small). Note that both processing do
not change (Pp, Pfa).
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5.2. Minimizing Distortion for Fixed Detection
This strategy aims to find the closest point rw to ro such that D(rw) = T + δ for some δ > 0. ZATT and PEAK
methods follow this strategy as explained in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
E(.) : RN → RN
ro → rw = argD(r)=T+δ min ‖r− ro‖ (16)
This strategy might not be possible as there are vectors where the embedding distortion is very high. The
probability to have such vectors is small. In theory, only the average embedding distortion counts. In practice,
there will certainly be an upper limit on the embedding distortion. Hence, the following pre- and post-processing
steps apply:
• pre-processing : if D(ro) > T + δ then rw = ro.
• post-processing : if ‖E(ro)− ro‖2 > Dmax then rw = ro
5.3. Maximising Robustness for Fixed Distortion
This strategy has been proposed by Cox et al.13 The constraint on the embedding distortion is not only fulfilled on
average but for all content as in (15). This does not mean that the watermarking vector is fixed: w(ro) is directed
to the point on the N -dimensional hypersphere of radius g and centre ro, which maximises R(ro + gw(ro)). An
expression of the robustness function is needed. For correlation based detectors such as DSSS, PEAK, ISS and
also the ZATT method, the following expression holds6:
R(r) = ‖r‖2
(
D(r)2
T 2
− 1
)
(17)
For the Janis detector, we proved that:
R(r) = ‖r‖2
((
D(r)
nT
)2/n
− 1
)
(18)
Note these expressions are only valid for vectors belonging to the critical region, i.e. D(r) > T .
5.4. Minimising Distortion for Fixed Robustness
This strategy aims to find the closest point rw to ro such that R(rw) = r.
E(.) : RN → RN
ro → rw = argR(r)=r min ‖r− ro‖ (19)
This strategy might not be possible as there are vectors where the embedding distortion is very high. An upper
limit might also be necessary as in Section 5.2.
5.5. Florencio-Malvar strategy
Florencio and Malvar give a method to find a trade-off between distortion, performance and robustness. From
Section 3.5, g(r) is modulated so that D(rw) = α − λD(ro). For a set of parameters {DE ,WCR,NCR}, λ is
optimised to maximise a given criteria such as the Kullback-Leibler distance, the power of the test or the global
robustness.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To illustrate the impact of the adopted strategy, we present results dealing with the trade-off between embedding
distortion and robustness. We have developed for this purpose a Matlab toolbox available at
http://www.irisa.fr/temics/Equipe/Delhumeau/ or http://ihl.ucd.ie/.
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6.1. Maximizing Detection for Fixed Distortion
Figure 2 gives the power plot for fixed distortion using the maximising detection strategy of Section 5.1, with
pre- and post-processing for DSSS and JANIS at n = 2, 4. Saving distortion when the embedding fails allows
us to increase the distortion for vectors whose embedding succeeds. This strategy has a higher benefit on less
efficient methods such as DSSS since approximately half of the original vectors remain untouched and half of
them bear an embedding distortion of ∼ −23 dB, leading to a global distortion of −26 dB. As a result, the
robustness has increased because the watermarked vectors are more deeply pushed inside the critical region.
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Figure 2. Maximizing detection for fixed distortion: Impact of pre- and post-processing (plain line) on prior art
method (dashed line). (a) Pp against WCR in dB, with N = 2400, Pfa = 10
−4. (b) Pp against NCR in dB for an average
distortion of −26 dB, and a maximum distortion of −22.7 dB (DSSS), −24.4 dB (JANIS n=2), −25.6 dB (JANIS n=4).
6.2. Minimising Distortion for Fixed Detection
To implement this strategy, the embedding is carried out using an iterative process: ri+1 = ri + g∇D(ri) where
ri=0 = ro. g is the iterative step of an equivalent WCR value of −46 dB. The iteration ends when D(ri) > T .
Observing Figure 3a, the following comments apply: on one hand, JANIS n = 4 needs less embedding distortion
than the others. This means that its critical area is more widely spread in RN . On the other hand, JANIS n = 4
is less robust to noise addition when the vectors are pushed just above the boundary of the critical region.
6.3. Maximising Robustness for Fixed Distortion
Figure 3b gives the Pp versus NCR for a fixed distortion of −26 dB using the strategy of Section 5.3 i.e.
maximising the robustness by setting w = ∇(R(r)).
6.4. Florencio-Malvar strategy
The Florencio-Malvar strategy was tested for JANIS and DSSS, i.e. ISS. Firstly, we choose λ maximising DKL.
For instance, in the ISS method:
λ = λ = argmax
[0,1)
1
2
(
log(ρ2((1− λ)2 +NCR))− 1 + 1
ρ2((1− λ)2 +NCR) +
N WCR− λ2
(1− λ)2 +NCR
)
The same strategy has been followed for JANIS and results are reported in Figure 1b. This strategy when applied
to DSSS has a really good impact: the resulting DKL is the highest we have achieved so far, for all NCR. Since
it is well known that JANIS is more efficient than DSSS when the noise attack is light,4 it would have been
expected that applying the Floriencio-Malvar strategy to JANIS would yield even better results. In fact, this
is not the case and it is really difficult to determine why this strategy is more beneficial to DSSS than JANIS.
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The fact that λ = 0 implies σd|H0 = σd|H1 . Hence, assuming d is still gaussian distributed, it is not the best test
statistic in the Neyman-Pearson sense.
Another important point to note is that DKL is a theoretical criteria. It is masking some important realities
of the detection problem, especially the existence of a fixed threshold T , related to Pfa . For this reason, we apply
the Florencio-Malvar strategy with Pp as the criterion to be optimised instead of DKL. For instance, DSSS gives:
Pp = 1− Q(η(λ)) = 1− Q
(
T − ρσo
√
N WCR− λ2
ρσo
√
(1− λ)2 +NCR
)
As we work in very difficult conditions, i.e. low N WCR for low Pfa , when λ = 0, η(0) < 0 because T <
√
N WCR.
Hence, when increasing λ, η gets greater in amplitude but its sign is still negative, so that Pp is a decreasing
function of λ as plotted in Figure 4b. In these conditions, the Florencio-Malvar strategy is useless for DSSS and
JANIS with order n = 2. Yet, this is not the case for JANIS with order n = 4 or n = 6. Hence, there exists an
optimal λ > 0 maximising Pp as shown in Figure 4b.
Figure 4a shows the power of the different tests and their improvement (for JANIS n = 4 and higher) with
this strategy. Prior art methods were either robust but inefficient (e.g. DSSS, JANIS), or efficient but not
robust (e.g. ZATT). Thanks to this strategy, JANIS schemes are now efficient and still robust. The optimal
parameter λ is set to one when NCR < −12 dB (this reduces then to an ‘erase and write’ strategy) and set to
zero (‘Maximising detection function for fixed distortion’ strategy) when NCR > −10 dB.
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Figure 3. (a) Minimising distortion for fixed detection: Pp against WCR in dB, with N = 2400, Pfa = 10
−4.
Achieved distortion are −22.3 dB (DSSS), −25.2 dB (JANIS n=2), −27.7 dB (JANIS n=4). (b) Maximising robustness
for fixed distortion: Pp against NCR in dB for a fixed distortion of −26 dB.
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Figure 4. (a) Pp against NCR in dB, with N WCR = 6.0 (N = 2400, WCR = −26 dB). (b) The Florencio-Malvar
embedding strategy does not improve Pp for DSSS. Here, NCR = −10 dB, there exists an optimal value for JANIS (n=4).
7. CONCLUSION
As far as robustness is concerned, the Florencio-Malvar strategy for maximising the power of the test yields
one of the best results. It is particularly interesting as the distortion is more or less controlled. But a caveat
is the fact that the embedder must expect the power of the noise attack. On the other hand, the ‘maximising
robustness for a fixed distortion’ strategy yields as good results as the latter one, but no expectation is done
about the strength of the attack.
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